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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
IP Justice is an international 501(c)(3) non-profit charitable organization 
based the United States.  IP Justice has been operating as an international 
technology rights and civil liberties organization since 2002.  It promotes 
Intellectual freedoms and advancement through Internet freedom, innovation 
policy, and a balance of intellectual property rights between content holders and 
users.  IP Justice contends that a free and open Internet is a prerequisite for a robust 
democracy and the promotion of innovation, technological advancement, and 
economic growth. 
Over the last two decades, IP Justice has selectively partnered with Amici 
Curiae in to provide courts with unbiased insights on important legal issues.  
Additionally, IP Justice participates in international policymaking fora including 
the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the United 
Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  IP Justice has held an accredited 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECSOC) since 2003.  The organization has been invited to testify before the U.S. 
Copyright Office as part of it’s rulemaking procedures under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  IP Justice has authored numerous academic 
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works on the interplay of technology and law with a particular focus on global 
issues affecting digital rights and Internet governance. 
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I. 
 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Florida Appellants’ appeal of the U.S. District Court’s preliminary 
injunction presents two main issues for review:   
1. Whether Florida’s state law S.B. 7072 violates the freedom of 
expression guarantees of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution; and 
2. Whether S.B. 7072 is inconsistent with and therefore preempted by 47 
U.S.C. § 230. 
II. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The factual and procedural underpinnings of this action are set forth 
adequately in the briefs of the parties herein.  In order to provide the Court with 
context for the arguments presented, Amicus Curiae sets forth key provisions of 
Florida’s S.B. 7072 (occasionally the “Act”) that will be analyzed here.   
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A. Key Terms of S.B. 7072 
The Act includes Florida Statute 501.2041(1)(j) which provides that “a 
social media platform may not take any action to censor1, deplatform2, or shadow 
ban3 a journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or broadcast.”   
Florida Statute 106.072(2) states that a social media platform must not 
“willfully deplatform a candidate for office who is known by the social media 
platform to be a candidate, beginning on the date of qualification and ending on the 
date of the election or the date the candidate ceases to be a candidate.”  
Florida Statute 501.2041(2)(h) prohibits a social media platform from using 
“post-prioritization4 or shadow banning algorithms” for content “posted by or 
                                           
1 “‘Censor’ includes any action taken by a social media platform to delete, 
regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, suspend a 
right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material posted by a 
user.  The term also includes actions to inhibit the ability of a user to be viewable 
by or to interact with another user of the social media platform.” Fla. Stat. 
§ 501.2041(1)(b). 
2 “ʻDeplatformʼ means the action or practice by a social media platform to 
permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from the 
social media platform for more than 14 days.”  Id. § 501.2041(1)(c). 
3 “ʻShadow banʼ means action by a social media platform, through any means, 
whether the action is determined by a natural person or an algorithm, to limit or 
eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to other 
users of the social media platform. This term includes acts of shadow banning by a 
social media platform which are not readily apparent to a user.” Id. 
§ 501.2041(1)(f). 
4 “Post-prioritization” means action by a social media platform to place, feature, or 
prioritize certain content or material ahead of, below, or in a more or less 
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about a user” who is known by the platform to be a candidate for office.  Thus it 
compels the publication of speech posted both by and about politicians on 
platforms.  Florida Statute 501.2041(2)(d) contains additional measures tending to 
discourage removing or demoting other speech.5  
The statue defines “journalistic enterprise” as those Florida businesses that 
meet high thresholds of popularity as measured by content consumption6.  “Social 
media platform” is broadly defined to cover most types of Internet service 
providers, but expressly exempts those that operate a Florida “theme park or 
entertainment complex.”  Fla. Stat 501.2041(1)(g).  The specific types of services 
that the Florida statute refers to as “social media platforms” are the same services 
that Section 230 describes as “interactive computer services”, this brief will 
collectively refer to these as “Platforms.”   
                                           
prominent position than others in a newsfeed, a feed, a view, or in search results.” 
Id., § 501.2041(1)(e). 
5 “A social media platform may not censor or shadow ban a user’s content or 
material or deplatform a user from the social media platform: 1. Without notifying 
the user who posted or attempted to post the content or material; 2. In a way that 
violates this part.” Id., § 501.2041(2)(d). 
6 The business must publish “in excess of 100,0000 words” online with 50,0000 
paid subscribers or 100,0000 active users, publish 100 hours of audio or video with 
“at least 100 million viewers annually”, operate a cable channel (with certain 
thresholds), or operate under a Federal broadcast license.  Id., § 501.2041(1)(d)1-4. 
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S.B. 7072 bars Platforms from exercising their private editorial discretion to 
remove, demote, modify, or add content posted by certain privileged users, 
“candidates for office” (which are politicians) and “journalistic enterprises” (which 
are large media organizations).  It creates a complex regulatory scheme for how 
ordinary users’ content can be published and for the removal of users from the 
Platform.  With the exception of content falling within Florida’s obscenity statute 
(Fla. Stat. 847.001.), the bar applies irrespective of the Platform’s purpose, be it 
disagreement with a particular viewpoint, violation of the terms-of-use agreement, 
a particular request by a user, or any reason.  The bar on Platform editorial 
discretion does not apply to content originating from Florida businesses that do not 
meet the statutory popularity thresholds, from individuals, or from businesses 
outside of Florida. 
III. 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Amicus Curiae urges the Court to uphold the preliminary injunction against 
S.B. 7072 as an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression and as 
preempted by 47 U.S.C § 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”).  S.B. 7072 forces Platforms to publish certain speech, favor certain 
speakers, and removes the editorial discretion to refuse, limit, or modulate the 
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same.  The purpose of enacting S.B. 7072 as described by the Chief Executive and 
legislators was to elevate one political ideology over another.    
Despite having some attributes of a public service, Platforms are in fact 
private entities and thus have a constitutionally protected right to editorialize and 
associate only with those users they choose.  Internet users have similar protected 
rights.  S.B. 7072 removes individual discretion and choice from consumers as to 
which viewpoints they wish to consume and instead forces Platforms to accept all 
politicians and journalistic enterprises (as those terms are defined) as members and 
to publish their speech.   In so doing, the regulation inserts the government as an 
“uber-moderator” trumping the otherwise agreed-upon standards contained in a 
Platform’s terms-of-use, and replacing it with a government edict.  S.B. 7072 
violates the First Amendment, is unlawful under Section 230 and, will harm the 
growing Internet sector of the United States’ economy, and permanently damage 




The importance of safeguarding the constitutionally protected right to free 
speech is among the most zealously guarded of our national rights.  It is viewed as 
indivisibly bound to our identity as a free and open society.  As President Harry 
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Truman reported in a Special Message to Congress on the Internal Security of the 
United States (Aug. 8, 1950):   
“Once a government is committed to the principle of 
silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to 
go, and that is down the path of increasingly repressive 
measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its 
citizens and creates a country where everyone lives in 
fear.” 
Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 486 (11th Cir. 2016) (First Amendment prevents 
use of government power to chill or punish speech with which government actor 
disagrees.).  So important is this fundamental right that Congress and Courts have 
created myriad protections as a moat protecting impingent on, or burdening of, this 
critical personal right.  Among those is Section 230.  That complex set of federal 
regulations was enacted in great measure to ensure that the then developing virtual 
arena of online speech would remain unfettered by government regulation.  To 
fortify the protection it created, Congress expressly, and broadly, preempted state 
regulation in the arena of Internet content regulation.   
A. S.B. 7072 Is A Violation of First Amendment Rights To Freedom 
of Expression and Association 
It has been well-established for nearly a quarter of a century that the Internet 
is the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed and content posted in 
that medium is entitled to the highest protection from governmental intrusion.  
ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (“Reno”).     
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“As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental 
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to 
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to 
encourage it.  The interest in encouraging freedom of 
expression in a democratic society outweighs any 
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”  
Id., at 885.    
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the “vast democratic forums of the 
Internet” present the “most important place[]… for the exchange of views.” 
Packingham v. North Carolina, __ U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735, (2017) 
(“Packingham”).  “[S]ocial media in particular” is entitled to the same First 
Amendment protections as other forms of media.  Id., at 1735; Matal v. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (First Amendment prohibits government entities from 
abridging freedom of speech).  These Constitutional safeguards apply to State 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 
652, 667-68 (1925).   
1. The Act Constitutes Government Action Against Private 
Citizens in Violation of the First Amendment  
“The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment constrains governmental 
actors and protects private actors.”  Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 
S. Ct. 1921, 1926, 204 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2019) (“Manhattan”).  Thus, while the state 
may not act as the arbiter of speech, private citizens may.  The former is an 
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impermissible government intrusion, while the latter is a zealously safeguarded 
right, critical to the orderly exchange of ideas in an open society.   
Nor does it matter whether the private actor is an individual, organization, 
entity, or corporation; each has an equally important protected speech interest:  
“First Amendment protection extends to 
corporations. [citations] . . . . [citations] Under the 
rationale of these precedents, political speech does not 
lose First Amendment protection “simply because 
its source is a corporation.”  . . . The Court has thus 
rejected the argument that political speech of 
corporations or other associations should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because 
such associations are not “natural persons.”  
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010), citing 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) 
(plurality opinion) (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining 
whether speech is protected.  Corporations and other associations, like individuals, 
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and 
ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster”). 
There can be instances where the line between private and public may be 
blurry.  This is not one of them.  Manhattan is instructive on this issue.  There, the 
Supreme Court analyzed whether a “public access” cable provider was properly 
deemed a government actor (or government-like) and thus subject to First 
Amendment restrictions.  In finding the entity was private, the High Court 
employed the state-action doctrine, which holds that a private entity will only be 
considered a state actor when it exercises a function “traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State.”  Manhattan 139 S. Ct. at 1926.  Justice Kavanaugh 
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explained that the “public access” cable provider failed the test.  “Providing some 
kind of forum for speech is not an activity that only governmental entities have 
traditionally performed… Private property owners and private lessees often open 
their property for speech.” Id., at 1930.  Agreeing with Judge Jacobs in Hudgens v. 
NLRB7, Manhattan held that it “is not at all a near-exclusive function of the state to 
provide the forums for public expression, politics, information, or entertainment.” 
Id.  Noting that different private entities have traditionally provided fora for public 
speech (including grocery stores putting up community billboards and comedy 
clubs hosting open mic nights), Manhattan reiterates the importance of protecting 
private editorial discretion: 
“In short, merely hosting speech by others is not a 
traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone 
transform private entities into state actors subject to First 
Amendment constraints. . . ʻThe Constitution by no 
means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication 
of private property to public use.ʼ  Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 
519, 96 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Benjamin Franklin did not have to operate his newspaper 
as “a stagecoach, with seats for everyone.” F. Mott, 
American Journalism 55 (3d ed. 1962). That principle 
still holds true. . . . to hold that private property owners 
providing a forum for speech are constrained by the First 
Amendment would be “to create a court-made law 
wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which 
                                           
7 424 U.S. 507 (1976).  
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 21 of 43 
 
 -12-   
private ownership of property rests in this 
country.” [citation].  
Id., at 1930-31.   
Thus, just as the “public access” providers in Manhattan had no duty to 
themselves refrain from content restrictions, so too the Platform owners do not.  
See, Manhattan 139 S. Ct. at 1930-1934 (Neither government regulations, use of 
government rights-of-way, nor other public communication infrastructure rendered 
cable operator a government actor.).  To the contrary, consistent with Reno, 
Packingham, and Citizens United, the Platforms, as private citizens, enjoy their 
own First Amendment protections.  This point is particularly important in light of 
the existence of contractual, private, terms of use agreements that Platforms enter 
into with their users.  These private contracts dictate the rules for acceptable 
conduct and speech by anyone who wishes to join the Platforms.  See Fteja v. 
Facebook, Inc., 841 F.Supp.2d 829 (2012) (upholding enforceability of Facebook’s 
website terms of service); Babcock v. Neutron Holdings, Inc., No. 20-60372 (S.D. 
Fla. Apr. 13, 2020) (upholding enforceability of mobile terms of service).  The 
result is a private marketplace of accepted norms, which include private content 
regulation agreed upon by user and Platform.   
The ability for social media platforms to self-regulate the content that is 
shared on their environments is vital to the development of a free and open 
Internet.  (See also Sect. IV.C.)  Private content moderation, when used with 
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proper discretion, can protect Internet users from content those users agree is 
harmful.  For example, Twitter, an online microblogging and social networking 
platform that allows users to post their own content and repost the content of 
others, has strict regulations against the posting of “hateful conduct”.  Twitter’s 
published “Safety and Cybercrime” Rules and Policies details what constitutes 
“hateful conduct,” the rationale behind the regulation, and the consequences for its 
violation.8  Similarly, social media network Facebook, has posted community 
standards against any content that promotes or incites violence,  criminal behavior, 
dangerous individuals or organizations, fraud, deception, and more.9  The absence 
of a standardized set of rules across all Platforms (as the Act dictates) allows users 
to select whatever Platform and corresponding terms and standards most closely 
aligns with the particular user’s beliefs and preferences.  The differing community 
standards, shared values, and rules itself generates microcosms of speech-
promoting habitats.     
Just as traditional private businesses are entitled to post rules such as “No 
Shirt, No Shoes, No Service” that customers are required to follow if they wish to 
                                           
8 Hateful Conduct Policy, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/hateful-conduct-policy (Retrieved 31 Oct. 2021). 
9 Community Standards, Facebook, 
https://m.facebook.com/communitystandards/violence_criminal_behavior/ 
(Retrieved 30 Oct. 2021). 
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patronize the business, Internet companies are free to post terms of service 
outlining their rules and policies for use including content moderation and 
deplatforming.  Charudattan v. Darnell, 834 F. App’x 477, 481–82 (11th Cir. 
2020).  (Deplatforming and blocking plaintiff’s comments from sheriff’s re-
election FaceBook page was private, not government action, and thus precluded 
First Amendment based 1983 claims). 
To be clear, Amicus Curiae does not advocate that this Court (or any branch 
of government) should view any particular term of use policy as good or bad.  
Precisely the opposite:  government should avoid the editorial process entirely.  
These forms of private content moderation allow the individual online Platforms to 
exercise their free speech rights to control the messaging on their Platforms in a 
fashion that they believe will protect the needs of their users.  Internet users then 
enjoy the freedom to engage with online Platforms that comport to their own 
standards of behavior and acceptable speech, selecting which communities with 
which they wish to associate and which they do not.  This balance aligns with the 
First Amendment and Congress’ intention in creating Section 230 to encourage 
private content moderation.  S.B. 7072 is a government action seeking to undo that 
Constitutionally protected form of private editorial discretion.     
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2. The Act Compels Speech in Violation of the First 
Amendment 
It is well established that “compelling cognizable speech...is just as suspect 
as suppressing it, and typically subject to the same level of scrutiny.” Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 480-81 (1997).  “[T]he First 
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech, a term necessarily comprising the 
decision of both what to say and what not to say.”  (Riley v. National Federation of 
Blind of N.C., Inc. 521 U.S. 457 (1988) (no constitutional significance to 
difference between compelled speech and prohibited speech); accord, Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 515 U.S. 557, 
573 (1995). 
In Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, the 
Supreme Court established that “compelling editors or publishers to publish that 
which reason tells them should not be published violates the First Amendment 
guarantee of a free press” Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (“Tornillo”).  Tornillo analyzed Florida’s 
“right of reply” statute that had granted a political candidate a right to equal space 
in a private newspaper to answer criticism and attacks on their record.  The 
Supreme Court struck down the statute as an unconstitutional compulsion of 
speech.     
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The Tornillo Court explained that the intrusion into the function of the 
editors’ selection of content violated the First Amendment.   
“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.  This of course 
includes discussions of candidates . . . The choice of 
material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made 
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and 
treatment of public issues and public officials whether 
fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control 
and judgment.  It has yet to be demonstrated how 
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be 
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of 
a free press as they have evolved to this time.”  
Id., at 257-258. 
Like the Platforms here, Tornillo involved private enterprises engaged in the 
communication and content republication business.  By providing a private 
platform for public discourse, newspapers and social media sites provide similar 
press services and have similar press interests including the constitutional right to 
control what information and viewpoints are published on their social media 
publications.  In fact, according to a 2021 Pew Research Center study, about half 
of Americans now get their news on social media, nearly a third of Americans 
regularly get news on Facebook, and 55% of Twitter users regularly get news on 
Twitter.10  Social media sites have become an important source of news and a 
                                           
10 Pew Research Center. (21 September 2021) “News Consumption Across Social 
Media in 2021” [Report]. 
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platform for public discourse in the Internet age. Packingham, 137 S.Ct. at 1737.  
The enhanced public discourse made possible by the Internet and social media, 
which provides an environment in which citizens engage in robust and open debate 
on public issues, provides an important democratic function.  It adds mightily to 
the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
376 U.S. 254, 270-279 (1964) (government-enforced discourse “dampens the vigor 
and limits the variety of public debate”).  
Despite the longstanding First Amendment prohibition on compelling 
private speakers to publish the unwanted speech of others, S.B. 7072 denies private 
Platform owners their right to moderate, censor, deplatform, or shadow ban certain 
government-selected users (“candidates for office” and “journalistic enterprises”), 
even when the Platform’s owners might find those users’ speech to be 
objectionable or in violation of their terms of use.  Platforms are required to carry 
that speech, lose their editorial discretion, and become publishers for speech that 
the government mandates.  Worse yet, this government prohibition on private 
editorial discretion discriminates between the government’s preferred users and 
those not covered by the Act.     
                                           
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-across-
social-media-in-2021/  
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Our Nation has a strong tradition of eschewing government mandated 
viewpoint control.  In W. Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 
624 (1943) the Supreme Court ruled that even statutory compulsion of patriotic 
acts (there are requirement to salute the flag) violates the First Amendment.  “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high 
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.” Id., at 642, accord Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) 
(Government may not use private license plates “as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the 
State’s ideological message” or prohibit individuals from holding or expressing a 
different view from the majority). 
An Internet that fosters a free and robust exchange of information from 
differing viewpoints serves a strong democratic interest that is harmed by the 
government’s regulation of speech with S.B. 7072.  As the Tornillo Court warned, 
governmental regulation of the crucial private editorial process cannot be 
consistent with First Amendment guarantees.  Tornillo 418 U.S. 241, 257-258. 
3. The Act Prevents Private Choice of Association in Violation 
of The First Amendment 
The guaranteed right to associate freely is closely connected to the right to 
free expression.  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 530 U.S. 640 (2000), the 
Supreme Court upheld the right to exclude others from private associations as a 
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right afforded by the First Amendment’s guarantee of Freedom of Association.  In 
Boy Scouts, the Boy Scouts revoked the membership of an assistant scoutmaster 
for conduct not in accordance with its membership policies.  The scoutmaster sued 
under a state accommodations law, claiming that the Boy Scouts could not exclude 
him from the association.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the member 
could be excluded.  The Court explained the state regulation would significantly 
burden the organization’s right to oppose certain conduct, holding that “the state 
interests … do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to 
freedom of expressive association.  That being the case, we hold that the First 
Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a requirement”.  Id., at 659.  In 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 357 U.S. 449 (1958) the Supreme Court ruled 
that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of 
speech.” Id., at 460. 
Online communities cultivated by private Platforms are no less of an 
association than private clubs, or educational organizations.  Florida Statutes 
106.072(2), which does not allow politicians to be deplatformed, and 
501.2041(2)(j), which does not allow large journalistic enterprises to be 
deplatformed, infringe on the right to associate in the same manner ruled 
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unconstitutional in BoyScouts and NAACP because it prevents the right to exclude 
certain participants and thus precludes the Platforms and their users from their 
right to oppose certain viewpoints or expressions.  The Platforms have a right to 
host, and the users have a right to join, on-line communities with viewpoints, 
standards, and beliefs of which they approve11.  The First Amendment precludes 
the State of Florida from mandating those associations.   
4. The Act Mandates Content, Speaker, and Viewpoint 
Discrimination in Violation of the First Amendment  
Viewpoint discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University 
of Virginia 515 U.S. 819 (1995): 
“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate 
speech based on its substantive content or the message it 
conveys. [Citations].  Other principles follow from this 
precept.  In the realm of private speech or expression, 
government regulation may not favor one speaker over 
another.  [Citations].  Discrimination against speech 
because of its message is presumed to be 
unconstitutional. [Citations] …  Viewpoint 
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content 
discrimination.  The government must abstain from 
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology 
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the 
                                           
11 Nor is the ability for users to block individual speakers any remedy.  That 
remedy does not allow the online community to self-select its organizational 
membership.  Just as a private club cannot be prohibited from excluding members 
under the theory that members could simply ignore the unwanted persons, so too 
individualized online blocking does not remedy the harm here.   
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rationale for the restriction.  See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).”  
Id., at 828-829 (1995). 
Thus, the government “is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects 
about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.”  
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010). 
The Supreme Court explained in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 
(1989) “the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases 
generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Id., at 791.  Content 
discrimination is often apparent from the face of the regulation, but Courts may 
also consider the stated purpose of legislation where the same demonstrates an 
intention to suppress expression.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 
646 (1994), accord.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564, (2011) 
(statements of proponent legislators relevant in confirming content discriminatory 
nature of regulation).   
The Act expressly targets political speech (speech by or about a candidate 
for office) and specific speakers (certain journalistic enterprises and candidates for 
office) providing that type and author of content with audience preferences that are 
not afforded to other users or other types of content that the government has 
chosen not to favor.  (See Sect. II.A.)  A speech regulation targeted at specific 
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subject matter is content-based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints 
within that subject matter. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. 
Comm’n of N. Y. 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).  Similarly, “[s]peech restrictions based 
on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content,” 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n 558 U. S. 310, 340 (2010).    Thus, 
the Act’s terms are content-based.   
That conclusion is readily buttressed by the stated intentions of the 
proponents of S.B. 7072, which evince the worst of constitutional violations: 
viewpoint discrimination.  As the District Court below noted, the Florida Governor 
and Legislature explained that S.B. 7072 was targeted at “leftist” speech with 
which they disagree, and that the Act was intended to elevate “conservative” 
speech.  Netchoice, LLC, v. Moody 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 121951 (N.D. Fla. June 
30, 2021), at pp.24-25.  Florida Governor DeSantis’ press release on S.B. 7072 
explained the Act was intended to counter viewpoints that “favor . . .the dominant 
Silicon Valley ideology.” 12 Legislative Representative Blaise Ingoglia, identified 
the Act as necessary because of his views that “our freedom of speech as 
conservatives is under attack by the ‘big tech’ oligarchs in Silicon Valley.  But in 
                                           
12 Press Release, Ron DeSantis, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the 
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, (24 May 2021), 
https://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-the-
censorship-of-floridians-by-big-tech/ 
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Florida, [this] … will not be tolerated.” 13 Id.  Whether the legislators’ and 
Governor's views were correct or not, the intention behind S.B. 7072 was 
unquestionably government promotion of a particular viewpoint.    
Government regulations of speech that are content-based or speaker-targeted 
are subject to the highest, strict scrutiny standard.  Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (“laws favoring some speakers over others 
demand strict scrutiny.”), Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona 576 U.S. 155 (2015), 
Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92 (1972).  The State Appellants, here, 
cannot meet their burden of showing “that the restriction furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” Arizona Free Enterprise 
Club PAC v. Bennett 564 U.S. 721 (2011) quoting Citizens United 558 U.S. at 340.    
The stated interest of furthering conservative ideology, or undermining 
perceived “silicon valley ideology” is not a legitimate state interest.  Moreover 
even that interest is not necessarily served by the Act, so it cannot be said to be 
narrowly tailored.  Promoting speech on one side of an issue or restricting speech 
on the other, is not a legitimate state interest.  Arizona Free Enter. Club v. Barnett 
564 U.S. 721, 749-750 (2011).   
                                           
13 Press Release, Ron DeSantis, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the 
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, (24 May 2021), 
https://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-the-
censorship-of-floridians-by-big-tech/  
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Assuming, for arguments sake, that Florida has identified a viewpoint in 
need of greater public attention, the answer, is already provided by private 
competition.  For every MSNBC, there is a Fox News.  For every Facebook or 
Twitter, whose agreed upon terms of use limit discourse in certain ways, there is a 
4chan, 8kun, 8chan14 and the like.  Some Platform restrict content in some ways, 
some restrict it in other ways, still others do not restrict it at all.  This is the beauty 
of free enterprise married with strongly enforced rights of Free Expression.   
In this Country, governments do not belong in the political speech 
moderation business, helping one ideological side or hampering another by 
government fiat.  That is behavior of authoritarian regimes, not free states 
protected by the First Amendment.  Because the Act does just that, it must remain 
enjoined.   
B. S.B. 7072 Is A Violation of The Communications Decency Act  
1. Congress Enacted Section 230 To Protect Platforms Against 
State Laws That Regulate Content Moderation 
Section 230 expressly encourages Platforms to moderate content on their 
online environments.  The Act states “no provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
                                           
14 https://www.cnet.com/news/8chan-8kun-4chan-endchan-what-you-need-to-
know-internet-forums/  
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provided by another information content provider” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  And 
further: 
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of— any action 
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected.”  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
These two statutory provisions give broad federal immunity to Platforms 
from being held liable for objectionable content shared to their website and 
encourages Platforms to moderate content using their own discretion as a form of 
protection against users consuming harmful information.  S.B. 7072 takes this 
editorial right away from Platforms and removes the consumer protection element 
intended by Section 230.  
Section 230 was enacted to overrule the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 199 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct 1995), which held an Internet provider could be held liable for 
defamatory statements of users. Medytox Solutions Inc., v. Investorshub.com, Inc., 
152 So. 3d 727, 730 (2014).  Congress enacted Section 230 to overrule this 
decision and remove the disincentives to self-regulation.  Zeran v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).  Courts have found that in enacting Section 
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230 Congress specifically intended “to allow computer service providers to 
establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.” Domen v. 
Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66, 73 (2nd Cir. 2021). 
The Congressional Research Service confirms that when Congress 
introduced Section 230, members who spoke in favor “argued that it would allow 
private parties, in the form of parents and internet service providers, to regulate 
offensive content, rather than the FCC”.15  In Attwood v. Clemons the Court 
explained that Section 230 “is a part of a larger legislative policy to allow private 
social media companies and private users to censor violent or obscene content 
from social media without fear of civil liability. Section 230(c)(2).  Congress has 
chosen to allow private companies and private users to censor.” Attwood v. 
Clemons, 2021 U.S. Dist. 49586 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2021) [emphasis in original].  
It goes further and states that Congress intended for social media and the Internet 
to be unfettered by federal or state regulation. Id.  “Congress wanted to encourage 
the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to 
promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 
(9th Circuit 2003).  Section 230 was therefore designed, in part, “to maintain the 
robust nature of Internet communication, and to accordingly keep government 
                                           
15 Valerie Brannon, Eric Holms, Cong. Research Serv., Section 230: An Overview, 
(April 7, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46751. 
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interference in the medium to a minimum.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
Congress recognized that privatized content moderation provides a safety 
check against the spread of harmful information by empowering private parties to 
demand that Platforms provide a healthy Internet environment that encourages the 
free flow of information while discouraging harmful content.  Thus, Section 230 
works hand-in-glove with the First Amendment. 
2. Section 230 Preempts State Laws Like S.B. 7072 
“The majority of ‘federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish 
broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’” Almeida 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).  Florida’s Supreme Court too has 
recognized the CDA’s broad preemptive effect.  Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 
So.2d 1010, 1018 (Fla.2001) (Section 230 expressly bars state actions). 
Because Congress enacted Section 230 to encourage private parties to 
engage in online content moderation and S.B. 7072 prohibits it, the Act must be 
enjoined as inconsistent with and thus, preempted by, federal law.  
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C. State Laws Like S.B. 7072 Harm The Growing Internet Sector Of 
The United States Economy 
U.S. businesses that permit and provide user-generated content represent a 
significant and growing portion of the Internet sector of the U.S. economy.  
According to a comprehensive study by the International consulting group and 
highly ranked think tank16, McKinsey Global Institute, the Internet sector has 
greater weight on GDP than agriculture or utilities.17  A primary reason such 
businesses have flourished is because of immunities for the speech of others that 
Section 230 provides to users and Platforms.  According to a 2020 study, by 
leading researcher Verified Market Research, the market for user-generated content 
software was valued at $90.70 billion in 2019, and is projected to reach $434.03 
billion by 2027, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 21.5% from 2020 to 
                                           
16 “History and Reputation of the McKinsey Global Institute”, ThinkTank Watch, 
(16 June 2016), http://www.thinktankwatch.com/2016/06/history-and-reputation-
of-mckinsey.html 
17 James Manyika and Charles Roxburgh, “The Great Transformer: The Impact of 
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2027.18  The study concludes that the possibility of regulation of user-generated 
content is one of the main impediments to growth in the market for that sector.    
Similarly, an Internet Association study asked American consumers about 
features and services most important to them when purchasing online.19  The 
survey showed that features and services enabled by Section 230 mattered most to 
consumers.  Section 230 encourages Platforms to host user-generated content, such 
as reviews, by holding speakers, not Platforms, liable for speech they post.  Results 
showed user reviews offer a sense of safety to sharing-economy customers, many 
of whom indicated they would not use the Platform without reviews.  
Another study by the Internet Association showed that reducing 
intermediary liability safe-harbor protections would cost the U.S. economy about 
$44 billion and 425,000 jobs each year.20  It showed companies will face higher 
                                           
18 “User Generated Content Software Market Size and Forecast”, Verified Market 
Research (Sept. 2020), https://www.verifiedmarketresearch.com/product/user-
generated-content-software-market/.  
19 Best Of The Internet: Consumers Rely On User-Generated Content, Internet 
Association, (25 June 2019), https://internetassociation.org/files/ia_best-of-the-
internet-survey_06-26-2019_content-moderation/ 
20 Christian M. Dippon, Economic Value of Internet Intermediaries and the Role of 
Liability Protections, NERA Economic Consulting, (5 June 2017), 
http://internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Economic-Value-of-
Internet-Intermediaries-the-Role-of-Liability-Protections.pdf 
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entry costs, limiting innovation, and that without the protections, consumers face 
higher costs and a less open and enjoyable online user experience. 
The importance of Section 230 to industry and society can also be 
demonstrated by turning to countries that do not provide such protections.  For 
example, a 2021 Malaysian appellate court decision held an online news Platform 
liable for the speech of its users who posted comments on a news story about 
government corruption in Malaysia.21  Because Malaysia neither provides its 
citizenry with protections like those in Section 230, nor those found in our First 
Amendment, online news outlet Malaysiakini was fined $124,000 over 5 
comments posted by users that the court deemed insulting to the judiciary.  Due to 
the hefty fine and legal risk of continuing to allow user-generated content on its 
platform, the news outlet was forced to go out of business.22  Put simply, where 
Section 230 immunities are absent, and government is allowed to dictate speech, 
Publishers simply cannot take the financial risk of allowing user-generated content. 
Myriad studies and anecdotal evidence buttress the findings of Congress and 
of our Courts – maintaining Section 230’s broad immunities and the related First 
                                           
21 Richard C. Paddock, “5 reader comments just cost a news website $124,000” 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/asia/malaysia-press-freedom-
guilty.html (last visited Nov 13, 2021). 
22 Id. 
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Amendment protections is critical to the growth of the Internet economy.  That 
economy, among the fastest growing sectors of the U.S. economy is also the “most 
participatory form of mass speech yet developed” (Reno, 521 U.S. 864) with its 
social media component providing among the “most important places . . . for the 
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